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Emphasizing Torts in Claims of Discrimination
Against Black Female Athletes
Alfred Dennis Mathewson*
In Black Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the
Junction,' I argued that an equality-based legal regime does not
provide an adequate remedy for African-American female athletes.
Instead I suggested that a tort-based regime may be more appropriate.
I did so knowing that gender and racial discrimination are torts and I
did not intend to suggest otherwise. They are statutory torts founded
upon equality principles. What I intended was to draw more upon the
general tort principles involved in an antidiscrimination action. I
specifically invoked the notion of using mass tort theories. I wish to
sketch a brief but more detailed framework for this proposition in this
article. In particular, I want to consider potential challenges brought
by African-American females at the collegiate and K- 12 levels, which
3
2
will be based upon Titles V1 and IX.
The difficulty that I hope to use tort theory to overcome is that
the gender-based antidiscrimination rules of Title IX do not provide
adequate recourse for African-American female athletes. Title IX
prohibits discrimination against females by educational institutions in
the provision of participation opportunities, financial support and
other benefits in athletic programs. Although Title IX has increased
the availability of opportunities for African-American females, most
colleges and universities have attempted to comply with Title IX by
adding opportunities for white females and cutting sports for males.4
African-American female athletes are unlikely to fare any better under
antidiscrimination laws prohibiting racial discrimination. It is certainly

* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; B.B.A., Howard
University; J.D., Yale University. Dean Mathewson teaches a course in Sports Law.
1. Alfred D. Mathewson, Black Women, GenderEquity and the Function at the Junction, 6
MARQ. SPORS L.J. 239 (1996).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race..
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994). Title IX reads, in pertinent part, "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. §
1681(a).
4. See Mathewson, supranote 1, at 251.
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the case that Title VI, a statute prohibiting racial discrimination by
educational institutions, has added few, if any, athletic opportunities
for African-American females. In fact, I am not aware of any
litigation tackling the discriminatory denial of opportunities and
benefits to African-American females in athletic programs on the basis
of Title VI.
In Function at the Junction, I relied on the pathbreaking
works of Professors Kimberle Crenshaw and Angela P. Harris.5 Both
explored the dynamics of the intersection of race and gender albeit
with quite different approaches. Crenshaw tended to focus on the
wrongful discriminatory acts while Harris focused on damages. There
are tortious forces of discrimination in Crenshaw's intersection. Black
women are hit by two discrete forces of discrimination separately or
in combination, one targeting race and the other, gender. These are
not forces of nature; they are the results of actions and inactions by
people. Such action and inaction may be intentional, or result from
unconscious discrimination and social norms. Some of these actions
target individuals or groups because of race or ethnicity; others target
gender.
Each force occurring separately produces harm; for example,
an individual who is denied a job because of race incurs damages.
There are economic damages like lost wages, additional job hunting
expenses, and time. There are the noneconomic personal damages
like loss of personal dignity, emotional distress and other psychic pain.
A woman who is denied a job because she is female incurs similar
damages.
Crenshaw identified another force that courts have had great
difficulty in sorting out when dealing with discrimination in equality
terms. She maintained that there was a separate and discrete force of
discrimination directed at African-American women.6 This force was
different from the combination of the racial force and gender forces.

5.

Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist

Critique ofAntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL

F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialismin FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
For further analyses of intersectionality in the sports setting, see Tonya M. Evans, Comment, In the Title
IX Race Toward GenderEquity, The Black FemaleAthlete is Left to FinishLast: The Lack ofAccess for
the "Invisible Woman," 42 How. U. 105 (1998); Marilyn V. Yarbrough, If You Let Me Play Sports, 6
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 229 (1996).

6.

See Crenshaw, supra note 5.
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In equality law, the distinction is very important because the result of
the force must be unequal treatment with members of a comparison
group.7 A black female would have a remedy in the case of combined
forces if the result of the conduct was that blacks were treated
unequally or women were treated unequally. In the case of the unique
force aimed at them, she would not be able to show unequal treatment
because of the absence of an appropriate comparison group.
In tort law, the distinction may be less important. A court
need only determine that an act was wrongful and then all the
foreseeable harm resulting from that conduct would be actionable.
Where a party commits more than one wrongful act simultaneously,
it is not necessary to determine which act produced what harm as they
are concurrent causes of the harm. The unique force against black
women is not actionable unless it is wrongful. It seems to me that
such a force must necessarily consist of a fusion of the racial and
gender discrimination forces both of which independently are
wrongful. Wrongfulness is the operative word. Discrimination against
black females and not black males or other females is no less wrongful
than discrimination against blacks or women in general. Black women
are included in two groups that are clearly protected by civil rights
laws. The failure to provide a remedy because of the conceptual
difficulty of finding an appropriate comparison group would violate
the fundamental tort principle that for every wrong, there must be a
remedy.
Professor Harris makes the case for damages by focusing on
the mixture of physical and experiential elements found in black
women. Her analysis does not require the existence of a unique force
aimed directly at black women. It is enough in her analysis that black
women be hit by only one of the forces. The essential part of her
theory is that black women because of their particular characteristics
will suffer more in the nature of eggshell plaintiffs. Race, gender,
culture and socio-economic circumstances lead to harm greater than
that suffered by blacks or women alone. For example, a black woman
who is denied a job because of her race and gender may incur greater
damages than a black male in the first instance and a white female in
7. Courts have become more willing to consider black women as an insular and discrete
minority. See, e.g., Daniel v. Church's Chicken, 942 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (considering black
women as a class although finding that plaintiff failed to show discrimination against that class).
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the latter instance. That the noneconomic damages may be higher for
the black woman is an intuitive conclusion. She would suffer perhaps
twice the psychic harm.
That the economic damages would be greater is also true but
less intuitive. The lost wages from a particular employer would be
identical. She was denied a job only once. However, the time
required to find another job and her job hunting expenses may be
higher because fewer employers may be willing to hire her. The
marketplace includes employers willing to discriminate on the basis of
race, on the basis of gender, and others on the basis of both. A black
male would lose out only with the first set of employers and a white
woman only with the second, but a black woman would be turned
down by all three sets. Since such employers generally do not
advertise their discrimination, she must seek jobs from more employers before finding one.
Current gender equity jurisprudence would provide black
women a remedy only with respect to harm caused by the first two
sets of employers. The damages, however, in either case would be
plainly inadequate. Neither the remedy for racial discrimination nor
gender discrimination would compensate her for the additional psychic
and economic damages. In the job discrimination example above, a
black woman would suffer greater psychic harm and economic harm
if denied a job for her race or her gender. Her job hunting expenses
and time will be high because she still must encounter all three sets of
employers plus other categories of employers who would not hire her
for other factors in her background, some legitimate, some not.
Regardless of which analysis is used, a remedy for racial
discrimination or gender discrimination will not adequately compensate black women for the discrimination they uniquely suffer. That is
because the antidiscrimination laws are equality-based which try to
provide the same remedy to those affected by the same discriminatory
force. It would be inappropriate to award a black woman a greater
remedy than a black male or white female denied the same job for
wrongful reasons. In many instances, the standard antidiscriminatory
approach leaves black women no remedy at all.
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I. THE COLLEGE CASE
The participation of African-American females in intercollegiate athletics is disproportionately low. 8 Their numbers in the
athletics program would be expected to be substantially
disproportionate when compared to the black student body at most
colleges and universities, whether an Historically Black Colleges and
Universities (HBCU) or an Historically White Institutions (HWI).9
That lower participation rate would be actionable if caused by a force
of discrimination. However, a black female plaintiff may sustain an
action under Title IX for gender discrimination against an HBCU
without raising intersection questions1° but if she brought one against
an HWI, it invariably would raise such questions.
A black female, like any other female, could bring a cause of
action if she can show that a university has denied her participation
opportunities because of her gender." She could bring such an action
under Title IX where the university fails to comply with any of the
three prongs of the test for compliance in the policy interpretation
administered by the United States Department of Education.12 This
test looks at women in general, not just black women. The difficulty
she would then face is that the university may seek to comply as
indicated above, and probably would be allowed to do so, by adding
sports that would increase the opportunities for women in general but

8. See Mathewson, supra note 1, at 245-52.
9. Black women tend to matriculate in college at higher rates than black men.
10. An action based on the unique force of discrimination against African-American females is
theoretically possible at an HBCU. Such an action would pose problems of proof that may be avoided by
a claim based on gender alone.
11. This article will be limited to participation opportunities and will not analyze the inequitable
allocation of financial aid and other treatment and benefit issues.
12. The then Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued a policy interpretation of Title
IX in 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The interpretation provided a three part test to determine whether
a university was satisfying its duty under Title IX to effectively accommodate the athletic interests and
abilities of its students. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417-18. Under the first prong, a university meets the duty if it
provides participation opportunities in intercollegiate competition for male and female students in numbers
substantially proportionate to the gender composition of the student body. Id. at 71,418. A university
satisfies the duty under the second prong if it has a history and continuing practice of program expansion
for the underrepresented gender. Id. If a university does not satisfy the duty under the first or second prong,
it may do so under the third prong by fully and effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented gender. Id.
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not necessarily for her.
It is not necessary to analyze whether an African-American
female athlete who was denied an opportunity to participate incurs
greater harm than other females. She must resort to a cause of action
under which she can request that the university add participation
opportunities in a sport in which she has an interest and ability. That
cause of action must focus on the university's wrongful acts of
discrimination that have harmed her. The university discriminated
against her first by limiting the participation opportunities for women
and then by offering insufficient participation opportunities in sports
in which black women have interest and ability. She nevertheless has
been injured by a wrongful act by the university and deserves a
remedy.
Her best bet under Title IX would be to make a case for
violation under the third prong of the three prong test.13 That is, she
should allege that the university has failed to fully and effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of the underrepresented
gender. This test permits plaintiffs to allege a violation of the rights
as a subset of the underrepresented gender. 14 The disadvantage is that
she must first show inequality between genders. Thus, she would not
have a cause of action at an institution like Brown University as long
as it is in compliance with the settlement agreement in Cohen v.
Brown University.5
Given that the subset includes the element of race, an AfricanAmerican female could try to use Title VI. This approach is uncharted territory in college athletics. There is scholarly literature
analyzing causes of actions by black athletes challenging NCAA initial
eligibility rules.' 6 Cureton v. NCAA, " a case applying those theories,
is now pending in the courts and will likely lead to the revision of
initial eligibility standards. In Cureton, black male and female
plaintiffs challenged their exclusion from participation opportunities
on the basis of race. Using Title VI specifically for black women

13.
14.
15.
16.

See supra note 12.
See supra note 12.
879 F. Supp. 185,211-13 (D.R.I. 1995). See also Mathewson, supra note 1, at 257 n.76.
Linda S. Greene, The New Rules ofthe Game: Academic Integrity orRacism?, 28 ST. Louis

U.L.J. 101 (1984); Kenneth L. Shropshire, ColorblindPropositions:Race, the SAT, & the NCAA, 8 STAN.
L. &POL'YREV. 141 (1997).

17.

37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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would be difficult because of the absence of precedent seeking to
compel universities to provide participation opportunities in the same
manner as Title IX. Black males obtained participation opportunities
as universities increased the number of black students admitted in
response to the Civil Rights Movement and antidiscrimination laws
like Title VI. However, those opportunities were not obtained
through litigation.
A black female would have to show that a force of racial
discrimination caused the lack of participation opportunities for her.
Her argument would be the same as it was under Title IX. There is
a subgroup of blacks for whom the university has chosen not to
provide participation opportunities in its athletic programs. The
university is not providing the same sports for women that are
available to black females at the developmental level.
Such a plaintiff could allege a count based on the combined
forces of racial and gender discrimination or the unique force of
discrimination against black women. That is, she would allege a claim
under a combination of Title IX and Title VI. The reason for the
combination is to seek a remedy specifically for black women by
showing a wrongful act that targeted them. This is more of a frontier
than the use of Title VI or Title IX alone. There is precedent for
combining Title IX with another antidiscrimination statute involving
black women.18 Therefore, such an approach should not be viewed as
an aberration, even if analytically unwieldy, as they are members of
groups protected by each statute.
Gender equity lawsuits are frequently brought as class actions.
An action by a class of black females would raise significant issues in
the gender-equity context. The difficulty in crafting an appropriate
class of African-American female athletes is reflected in consideration
of remedies. What types of sports should a university add? There are
cases in which courts have refused to certify a class of women athletes
from multiple sports on the grounds that their interests conflict so that
they can not fairly represent the proposed class.' 9 These questions are
squarely presented in Professor Harris's warning about the pitfall of

18. Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 897 F. Supp. 1535 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
19. Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 996 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Bryant v.
Colgate Univ., No. 95-CV-620, 1996 WL 328446, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June I, 1996); Boucher v. Syracuse
Univ., No. 95-CV-1029, 1996 WL 328441, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 1996).
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the "essential black woman."2 ° Middle class black females from
suburban areas are likely to have been exposed to many of the same
sports that white women are. However, they may not embrace some
of those sports even when they have exposure because of the lack of
traditions and encouragement. Black women from inner city communities or small rural communities, particularly in the south, may not
have access to those sports. Even where there is access, there is the
issue of racial stacking. 1 Black females have been steered historically
into basketball and track.
Perhaps, the answer lies not in what sports should be added,
but cultivating the interest of black women in new sports at the
collegiate level who have athletic ability and providing them participation opportunities. This has been the approach of the HBCUs 2
Professor John C. Weistart offers another radical solution, although
he was not proposing it as one specifically for black women. 3 He
suggests that the model of one team per sport at a university might be
abandoned. Given the existence of stacking, black women would be
expected to benefit from an increase in participation opportunities
where a university fields more than one basketball team or enlarged its
track team.
Monetary damages may be available in private actions to
enforce Title VI and Title IX.24 Although courts have been reluctant
20. See Harris, supra note 5.
21. "Stacking involves the assignment of certain individuals to specific athletic positions based
on race or ethnicity rather than ability. For African-Americans, stacking historically relegated them to
positions" which were thought to require purely physical abilities such as speed and quickness, as opposed
to positions which were thought to require thinking and control skills. Timothy Davis, The Myth of the
SuperSpade: The Persistenceof Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 659 (1995).
The litigation in Cohen began in 1992 when Brown University announced that it was cutting programs for
budgetary reasons. It led to four reported opinions. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I.
1992); 991 F.2d 888 (lst Cir. 1993); 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995); 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997).
22. Jim Naughton, Title IX Poses a ParticularChallengeat PredominantlyBlack Institutions,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuc., Feb. 20, 1998, at A55; Paul White, ConsultantHas Harsh Criticismfor NSU
Athletics butSome Officials Feel the Problems He PointsOut Are Overstated,THE VIRGINIAN-PILOTAND
LEDGER-STAR, Oct. 15, 1998, at C1.
23. John C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized College Sports?,
3 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 244-45 (1996).

24. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (monetary damages are available
for intentional discrimination under Title IX); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of New
York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (monetary damages not available under Title VI for unintentional
discrimination). The distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination adds a conceptual
difficulty to an action involving the unique tort of discrimination against African-American females. See
Daniel v. Church's Chicken, 942 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (allowing a finding of disparate impact by
comparing African-American females with all groups).
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to award them in Title IX suits, cases involving discrimination against
black females in collegiate athletic programs may be more appropriate
for such damages, especially in the case of stacking. In Pedersen v.
Louisiana State University,25 the court declined to award damages
because it did not find an intentional violation. As I indicated above,
much data is now available on the availability of sports for black
women. A university that fails to consider this issue in developing a
gender-equity compliance program, especially if it has a significant
black female student body population, will have to explain its intent.
The adoption of a program with knowledge of its impact on AfricanAmericans is the heart of the Cureton case.
II. THE ACTION AGAINST THE STATE
The discrimination against African-American females may be
attributed to state action. The interest and ability of African-American
females in specific sports is directly affected by the opportunities
available to them at the developmental level. In public schools
operated by states, that means athletic opportunities in grades K-12.
African-American females may make three basic claims about
discrimination against them at this level.26 First, the state has
discriminated against them by limiting the participation opportunities
available to females, perhaps giving rise to a claim under Title IX.
Second, the state has discriminated against them by limiting participation opportunities and resources in athletic programs in schools with
significant African-American student enrollments, perhaps, giving rise
to a claim under Title VI or Title IX, or both. Finally, the state has
discriminated against them by steering them into a few sports, also
giving rise to a claim under Title VI and Title IX.
I also suggested a mass torts approach in Function at the
Junction, but a global action against a state would probably not get
very far in the courts. Mass torts have been frowned upon by the
courts, 27 and a class action on behalf of African-American females in

25. 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
26. The state discriminates against them by providing fewer participation opportunities at state
supported colleges and universities.
27. Barry F. McNeil & Beth L. Fancsal, Mass Torts and Class Actions: Facing Increased
Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483,487 (1996).
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grades K-12 enrolled in public schools in a particular state would
appear to involve many of the features that make such actions
disfavored. A mass tort action is generally used where there are
numerous plaintiffs injured by a single wrongful act or in a single
incident.28 As indicated above, there are at least three identifiable acts
of discrimination, perhaps affecting three different subsets of AfricanAmerican females. Moreover, the intersection of race and gender
presents similar complications. The three causes of action above
present three different classes of African-American females: those
harmed by gender discrimination, those harmed by racial discrimination and those harmed by discrimination against African-American
females. Consequently, a single class action on behalf of all black
female athletes would be unworkable.
There may be additional subsets of African-American females.
Some may be differentiated on the same basis as the ones in the
collegiate gender-equity class actions above. Black females have
interests in different sports. A girl who desires the addition of
equestrian sports may not adequately represent one who desires to see
more basketball teams. Others may be differentiated by school
district. The occurrence of any of the three wrongful discriminatory
acts may vary by school district as some districts may offer sports not
available in others. Stated in socio-economic terms, black females
from affluent areas may have different interests than those from
economically disadvantaged areas even though both groups may have
been harmed by the same act of discrimination on the part of the state.
They may thus sustain different injuries and thus may be required to
bring separate actions. Such distinctions do not preclude mass tort
actions in this area; they simply require more of them with smaller
classes.
In fact, it may be more difficult for black females from affluent
areas to show an injury from the force of discrimination against black
females than those from economically disadvantaged areas. It is
necessary to distinguish between the harm occurring as a result of
discriminatory acts at the collegiate level from those at the K- 12 level.
At the collegiate level, the state would have discriminated against

28. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass PersonalInjury Litigation:
A Socio-LegalAnalysis,59 BROOK. L. REv. 961,965 (1993).
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black females by not offering sufficient participation opportunities at
state institutions in sports in which black females have interest and
ability or by adding sports that are more available to white females.
Black females from suburban and affluent areas may be more likely to
have access to sports like field hockey, golf, ice hockey, lacrosse and
water polo, one or more of which may have been added by colleges
and universities to comply with Title IX. If a black female had access
to those sports at the developmental level, she could not claim to have
been harmed as a black female if she attends a state university and she
does not make one of those teams. She may be able to claim such
harm if the public school had a history of racial stacking. She still may
have a claim as a woman for additional sports if the state university is
still not in compliance with Title IX. She may have a claim before she
attends a state university if the state does not offer sufficient participation opportunities in any of its colleges and universities.
A black female from an economically disadvantaged school
district, or any school district for that matter, that offered limited
participation opportunities for girls may be able to show the force of
discrimination against black women. In those districts, the opportunities for all students including black males, would be limited. Again the
claim would be that the state is providing athletic programs in its
universities that do not offer sufficient participation opportunities for
them. The remedies for both groups, however, would be similar to
those where a college or university was sued directly. The state may
be required to provide opportunities to able athletes in sports that are
new for them.
At the K-12 level, the actions would be different depending on
the socio-economic circumstances of school districts. The state is
likely to offer black females in economically disadvantaged areas
participation opportunities in a narrower range of sports than in more
affluent suburban districts. One remedy is to require the state to offer
and fund the same range of sports in economically disadvantaged
districts as in more affluent districts. States also tend to classify
schools within districts by size and offer opportunities accordingly.
Black females in smaller schools would have fewer opportunities than
those in larger schools. The state could be required to provide the
same sports in the smaller schools as provided in the larger schools.
The racial demographics of the district or school also play a factor.
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The magnitude of the force of discrimination against black females is
likely to vary directly with their relative presence in the district or
school. This factor would apply in all districts or schools, regardless
of size and socio-economic factors. Thus, the state may be required
to provide the same sports in districts with significant populations of
blacks as are offered in districts where their numbers are relatively
insignificant.
The objective of using mass tort actions is to force states
which provide developmental opportunities in public schools K- 12 to
supply more such opportunities for black females so that they have a
fair opportunity to reap the benefits of the programs available at the
collegiate level and beyond. As shown in Function at the Junction,
merely increasing opportunities for females is inadequate. At the
collegiate level, the Office of Civil Rights requires colleges to consider
the sports offered at the developmental level in its primary enrollment
area in deciding which sports to add. Perhaps, a state should be
subjected to a similar requirement at the K- 12 level; the state should
offer in each school district those sports that are being offered in its
colleges and universities.
Mass tort litigation on behalf of various classes of AfricanAmerican female athletes appears more of an academic inquiry as no
such litigation appears on the horizon. When such lawsuits do occur,
they will likely be on a small scale targeting specific school districts.
Lawyers may start with classes of African-American females in
economically disadvantaged school districts until there has been a
sufficient number of cases to mature this mass tort.29 Similar litigation
may be brought on behalf of other females of color. Those cases may
not be joined with those for African-American females for the same
reasons that mass torts on behalf of African-American females will be
difficult.
III. CONCLUSION
African-American female athletes do have a cause of action for
the wrongful acts of colleges and universities, school districts and

29.
(1995).

FrancisE. McGovern,An Analysis ofMass TortsforJudges, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1821,1842-44

1999]

Black Female Athletes

829

other state agencies in discriminating against them in athletic programs. These wrongful acts deprive African-American females of the
benefits of participation in athletics and, accordingly, are actionable
under gender and racial discrimination laws. Such acts are actionable
even when it is determined that they were directed at AfricanAmerican females, and not also at females or blacks in general. The
development of mass tort class actions while theoretically possible is
likely to develop slowly. Mass tort specialists will have the dubious
task of crafting classes consisting of something other than the
"essential" African-American female. That will require distinguishing
between the types of wrongful acts, the socio-economic and other
circumstances of the potential plaintiff classes.

